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WHY CULTURE MATTERS IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:
THE MARGINALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE WORLD BANK
By Galit A. Sarfaty*

Why do international institutions behave as they do? International organizations (IOs)
have emerged as significant actors in global governance, whether they are overseeing monetary
policy, setting trade or labor standards, or resolving a humanitarian crisis. They often execute
international agreements between states and significantly influence domestic law. It is thus
important to analyze how international institutions behave and make policy. In order to
understand institutional behavior and change, it is useful to conduct an ethnographic analysis of
the internal dynamics of IOs, including their formal and informal norms, incentive systems, and
decision-making processes. This Article analyzes the organizational culture of one particularly
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powerful international institution—the World Bank—and addresses the question of why the
Bank has not adopted a human rights policy or agenda.1
Established on July 1, 1944, the World Bank has become the largest lender to developing
countries, lending over $20 billion per year.2 With over 10,000 employees (including
economists, sociologists, lawyers, and engineers, among others), its mission is poverty reduction,
which it primarily carries out through its development lending.3 While the institution has adopted
a number of social and environmental policies and works on issues as diverse as judicial reform,
health, and infrastructure, it has not adopted any overarching operational policy on human rights.
Human rights concerns are not systematically incorporated into the everyday decision-making of
staff or consistently taken into consideration in lending; existing incorporation of human rights is
ad hoc and up to the discretion of employees.4 In addition, many employees consider it taboo to
discuss human rights in everyday conversation and to include references to it in their project
documents. The marginality of human rights stands in contrast to the Bank’s rhetoric, including
official reports and public speeches by its leadership in support of human rights.5
1

While the Bank has no operational policies on human rights per se, its Indigenous Peoples Policy
addresses the rights of indigenous peoples. 1 WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OD 4.20, ¶
6 (Indigenous Peoples) (which aims to ensure that “the development process fosters full respect for the[] dignity,
human rights, and cultural uniqueness” of indigenous peoples).
2
The World Bank Group, one of the United Nations’ specialized agencies, consists of five closely
associated institutions, which are owned by member countries that carry ultimate decision-making power in all
matters, including policy, financial, and membership issues. The term “World Bank Group” encompasses all five
institutions, including the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The term “World Bank,” as I use it in this Article, refers
specifically to two of the five, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the
International Development Association (IDA).
3
Out of the 10,000 Bank employees, about 7,000 are based in the Washington, D.C. headquarters and
3,000 work in the field offices.
4
There are some minor exceptions. For instance, some Bank documents have referred to human rights, and
certain employees indirectly work on human rights, particularly economic, social, and cultural rights.
5
See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK
(1998); HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson
eds., 2005) (including contributions by senior World Bank officials, including former President James Wolfensohn);
THE WORLD BANK INSTITUTE DEVELOPMENT OUTREACH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (Oct. 2006).
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What do I mean when I say that human rights is a marginal issue within the Bank? In
other words, there is no comprehensive or consistent approach on the policy and operational
levels. In more specific terms, there are at least three provisions/safeguards missing at the Bank:
(1) There is no staff policy to mitigate the impact of Bank projects on human rights. (2) When
Bank employees engage in country dialogues or draft Country Assistance Strategies, they are not
required to consider countries’ obligations under international human rights law.6 (3) The Bank
has no guidelines on when it would suspend operations due to human rights violations.
Why should we be surprised that human rights is such a marginal issue at the World
Bank? I contend that there are a number of compelling reasons for why the Bank’s approach to
human rights (or lack thereof) appears counterintuitive. First, other institutions involved in
poverty reduction, including the United Nations Development Program, the United Nations
Children’s Fund, and the UK’s Department for International Development, have begun to adopt
human rights policies or a rights-based approach to development.7 Second, the Bank has been
subject to pressure from civil society organizations and internal advocates to integrate human
rights considerations in its projects and programs. Third, private financial institutions have begun
to address human rights more openly out of a concern for their public image and the reputational
6

The World Bank normally develops a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) every one to three years in
consultation with the borrower country’s government and civil society organizations. This strategy addresses the
country’s top development priorities, creditworthiness, past portfolio performance, and the level of financial and
technical assistance that the Bank seeks to provide the country.
7
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP), HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNDP PRACTICE NOTE (2005);
UNITED NATIONS (UNICEF) EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE: GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED PROGRAMMING
APPROACH (1998). A rights-based approach typically requires institutional change and the creation of accountability
mechanisms so that human rights are treated as constitutive of the goal of development. Yet scholars have
challenged its effectiveness in achieving practical, on the ground changes to development work. See CELESTINE
NYAMU-MUSEMI & ANDREA CORNWALL, WHAT IS THE “RIGHTS-BASED” APPROACH ALL ABOUT? PERSPECTIVES
FROM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES (Institute for Dev. Stud. Working Paper No. 234, 2004); PETER
UVIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (2004); Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of
the Human Rights and Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM.
RTS. Q. 755 (2005); Mac Darrow & Amparo Tomas, Power, Capture and Conflict: A Call for Human Rights
Accountability in Development Cooperation, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 471, 537 (2005).
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risk of committing human rights abuses.8 Even the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the
Bank’s private sector arm, has openly adopted human rights as part of a risk management
approach, although its engagement in selective human rights has been subject to criticism by
NGOs.9 Despite these three factors, one would have expected the Bank to have already adopted a
strategy on human rights. Yet it has not. Why?
I argue that legal and political obstacles do not fully explain this phenomenon; what has
been missing from existing explanations is an anthropological analysis of the Bank’s
organizational culture that would shed light on internal obstacles to the adoption of human rights
norms. Whether and how the Bank should adopt human rights is a topic that has been discussed
at length by academics and civil society advocates.10 However, I contend that this literature
primarily focuses on legal arguments for binding the Bank and its member countries to
international human rights obligations. It does not investigate the internal workings of the
bureaucracy in order to understand why the Bank has yet to adopt and internalize human rights
norms. This Article offers an empirical analysis of the Bank’s organizational culture based on
ethnographic field research at the institution over four years, including personal interviews,
participant observation, and analysis of Bank documents.11 My ethnographic research on the
World Bank sheds light on why organizational change has not occurred and suggests the

8

See, e.g., The Equator Principles for private banks that are modeled after the International Finance
Corporation’s social and environmental policies, available at http://www.equator-principles.com/.
9
See, e.g., Steve Herz et al., The International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards and the
Equator Principles: Respecting Human Rights and Remedying Violations? (2008) (representing views from a
number of NGOs including the Center for International Environmental Law, Bank Information Center, Oxfam
Australia, and World Resources Institute), at http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/IFC_Framework_7Aug08.html.
10
Recent books devoted to this topic include: MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW: THE WORLD
BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 126 (2003); BAHRAM
GHAZI, THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, AND THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2005); SIGRUN I. SKOGLY, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2003).
11
See infra Part II.C for a more detailed description of my research methods.
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conditions under which it can happen. The reason why I selected this case is because despite
external pressure over the past two decades and repeated attempts by insiders to push the human
rights agenda forward, there has been neither norm adoption nor internalization.12
I have found that the ways in which norms become adopted and ultimately internalized in
an institution in large part depends on their fit with the organizational culture. When a new norm
is introduced, employees may interpret it in different ways. In the case of the Bank, employees
from different professional groups often have distinct interpretive frames that they use to define
issues, analyze their relevance to the Bank’s mission, and apply them in practice. Proponents of a
norm must account for internal conflict over competing frames when trying to persuade staff to
accept it. They must also consider the operational procedures, incentive system, and management
structure of the organization when determining the most effective strategy of implementation.
Thus in order to bring about internalization, actors must adapt norms to local meanings and
existing cultural values and practices—in other words, they must “vernacularize” norms.13
This Article will proceed as follows. In Part I, I argue that theories of international
institutions should account for the internal dynamics within organizational cultures, which shape
how institutions change and influence state behavior. Ethnographic research can help us analyze
the conditions under which norms are internalized, including the degree to which they should be
legalized. Applying a principal-agent model to IOs, I then argue that one has to look beyond
12

Adoption refers to an institution’s acceptance of a norm and its manifestation as a formal or informal
rule. Internalization refers to the acceptance of a norm by actors within the organization who are persuaded of its
merits and validity through such processes as social learning, framing, and deliberation. Ryan Goodman and Derek
Jinks refer to these mechanisms as persuasion. They distinguish persuasion from coercion and acculturation, which
entails the adoption of norms without belief in their content, driven by social and cognitive pressures. Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE
L.J. 621 (2004).
13
Sally Engle Merry, Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle, 108 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 38, 39 (2006). See also SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE:
TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2005).
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states to understand and predict how international institutions behave. In Part II, I address the
question of why human rights has remained such a marginal issue at the Bank, despite internal
and external pressure that would suggest otherwise. After reviewing legal constraints in the
Bank’s Articles of Agreement and failed efforts from the early 1990s through 2004 at
introducing a human rights agenda at the Bank, I argue that bureaucratic obstacles have played a
large role in impeding human rights adoption. I focus on the 2006 Legal Opinion on Human
Rights by the departing General Counsel and its failure to generate organizational change due to
its uncertain legal status and internal conflict within the department.14 Part III analyzes the
Bank’s organizational culture, including formal and informal processes of norm socialization; the
incentives and operational policies that influence what employees value and how they reconcile
competing goals; the production and circulation of knowledge within the organization; and
power dynamics between professional subcultures. I focus on the prestige of economists and the
lower status of lawyers in the Legal Department, and ultimately argue that the clash of expertise
in the Bank is a critical obstacle in achieving human rights norm internalization. Part IV argues
for the importance of framing norms to adapt to organizational culture. After examining
interpretive battles among Bank lawyers and economists over how to define human rights norms
and interpret them with respect to the Bank’s mission, I discuss the most recent attempt to
introduce human rights into the Bank. I describe how members of the Bank’s Legal Department
are following an incremental strategy of framing human rights for economists, which
demonstrates how they are learning from the failures of prior attempts and adapting their

14

Roberto Dañino, Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank (Jan. 27, 2006), at
http://www.ifiwatchnet.org/?q=en/node/335.
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approach to the Bank’s organizational culture. The conclusion analyzes the potential risks of
achieving norm internalization at the Bank by economizing rather than legalizing human rights.
I. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
International organizations (IOs) have become an emerging topic of study among
scholars in international law and international relations. My case study of the World Bank
demonstrates the importance of ethnographic research towards explaining IO behavior. An
analysis of an IO’s bureaucratic culture, including the politics of expertise within it, can help
explain organizational change. It can identify conditions for the internalization of norms,
including the degree to which they should be legalized. Applying a principal-agent model to IOs,
I argue that one has to look beyond states to understand and predict how international institutions
behave, particularly when their behavior departs from the interests of member states.
Analyzing Norm Diffusion and the Limits of Legalization Through Ethnographic Research
Studies of international institutions should account for their internal dynamics, including
possible internal divisions between departments and individuals. Instead of only focusing on
state interests, we need to examine the bureaucratic practices of the background experts that run
institutions. As my study of the World Bank affirms, the actions and decisions of bureaucrats are
critical factors in shaping how the institution operates and influences state behavior. These
experts “do not speak in the language of interests or ideologies—they speak professional
vocabularies of best practices, empirical necessity, good sense, or consensus values.”15 In order
15

(2005).

David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 1, 11
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to understand the politics of expertise within IOs, we must analyze their underlying
organizational cultures.
Previous scholarship in international relations (IR) and international law has understudied
the norm dynamics that operate within IOs and overemphasized the role of states in shaping IO
behavior. The rational actor theories that have historically dominated international relations—
realism and functionalism—are largely state-centric in their analyses of how IOs behave.16 IOs
play a larger role in the models developed by neoliberals and institutionalists, who disaggregate
the state and focus on the actions and interests of individuals, interest groups, and political
institutions that shape state preferences. Constructivist accounts have further departed from
traditional IR theory by providing more autonomy to IOs, which serve as vehicles by which
states are socialized into complying with norms.17 Yet while constructivists have moved
international relations away from state-centric theories, they are only beginning to provide
empirical accounts of IO behavior.18
While legal scholars have increasingly treated IOs as their object of study, they have
underemphasized their organizational cultures and internal politics. Interest-based models
provide a rationalist account to explain state interests and behavior.19 Norm-based models,
including managerial theory and the transnational legal process school, have focused on the

16

See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); NEOLIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986); KENNETH N.
WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
17
See, e.g., John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together: Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social
Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. (1998); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391-425 (1992).
18
MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN GLOBAL POLITICS 6 (2004); Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 699 (1999).
19
See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
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question of why states comply with international norms.20 Scholars have also measured the
extent of countries’ implementation and compliance with treaties over time.21 In addition, there
is a growing literature on mechanisms of norm socialization to explain how law influences state
behavior.22 Yet, this scholarship has not investigated the process of norm development within
IOs. What is needed is evidence of what David Kennedy calls “the vocabularies, expertise, and
sensibility of the professionals who manage . . . background norms and institutions, [which] are
central elements in global governance.”23
Ethnographic research can provide a comprehensive analysis of the organizational
cultures of IOs and how they change. It involves an in-depth, case-oriented study, including
long-term fieldwork within an institution and in-depth interviews. Fieldwork means that one is
usually “living with and living like those who are studied. In its broadest, most conventional
sense, fieldwork demands the full-time involvement of a researcher over a lengthy period of time
. . . and consists of ongoing interaction with the human targets of study on their home ground.”24
Conducting fieldwork in an institution means that one engages in direct, first-hand observation of
employees’ daily behavior and participates in their activities, such as training workshops,
seminars, and project meetings. In addition, one often conducts archival work and interpretive
analysis of documents.
Anthropological research aims to answer a question rather than test a hypothesis. It is not
based on prior assumptions or models, as are other methods. Rather, hypotheses and theories
20

See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
21
See ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998).
22
See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 12.
23
Kennedy, supra note 15, at 3.
24
JOHN VAN MAANEN, TALES OF THE FIELD: ON WRITING ETHNOGRAPHY 2 (1988).
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emerge from the data, and are constantly evaluated and adjusted as the research progresses.25 The
following is a concise summary of the cycle of ethnographic research:

In ethnography . . . you learn something (“collect some data”), then you try and make
sense of it (“analysis), then you go back and see if the interpretation makes sense in light
of new experience (“collect more data”), then you refine your interpretation (“more
analysis”), and so on. The process is dialectic, not linear.26
Therefore when ethnographers interview subjects, they “do not automatically assume that they
know the right questions to ask in a setting.”27 Interviews are usually unstructured or semistructured with open-ended questions that are developed in response to observations and ongoing
analysis. The questions are designed to seek respondents’ interpretations of what is happening
and allow them to describe problems, policy solutions, their rationales, etc. in their own words.
My ethnographic study of the World Bank followed this research protocol. As part of my Ph.D.
dissertation research in anthropology, I worked and conducted fieldwork at the Bank
headquarters in Washington, D.C. for approximately two years over a period of four years, from
2002-2006. During the summers of 2002 and 2004, I served as a consultant and intern in the
Legal Department and the Social Development and Environment Departments of the Latin
America and Caribbean region. My position as an intern for two summers afforded me the trust
to gain access for a full year of fieldwork, from September 2005 until July 2006. While this

25

John Comaroff argues that “anthropology always rests on a dialectic between the deductive and the
inductive, between the concept and the concrete, between its objectives and its subjects, whose intentions and
inventions frequently set its agendas” (Michèle Lamont & Patricia White, Workshop on Interdisciplinary Standards
for Systematic Qualitative Research 37, report available at
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/ISSQR_workshop_rpt.pdf).
26
MICHAEL H. AGAR, THE PROFESSIONAL STRANGER: AN INFORMAL INTRODUCTION TO ETHNOGRAPHY 62
(1996).
27
HELEN B. SCHWARTZMAN, ETHNOGRAPHY IN ORGANIZATIONS 54 (1992).
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Article is focused on my research during this time, I have revised the material accordingly based
on recent developments.
My methods included interviews with more than 70 staff (from project managers to a
former President), Executive Directors, U.S. Treasury officials, and NGO representatives;
participation at Bank training sessions and seminars; and analyses of Bank projects and
documents. When I observed meetings or interviewed employees, I described the purpose of my
research and obtained their informed consent. Almost all interviews were recorded and
transcribed, and were conducted under the condition that I not use the employees’ names. Thus I
only provide the current (or former) position and department of the people that I interviewed,
unless I was given verbal consent to provide their full identity.28
By conducting ethnographic research on the Bank, I was able to uncover the formal and
informal norms and the decision-making processes within the institution that shape state
behavior. I aimed to examine the institution from the top down as well as the bottom up,
focusing not only on its leadership and administrative structure, but also on the tasks and
incentives of staff. I analyzed the informal practices and unspoken assumptions held by
employees that may be misinterpreted by or hidden from external observers as well as the
employees themselves. By doing so, this study reveals the competing subcultures and other
internal contestations that may impede norm internalization.
Why do certain norms and policies become adopted in an institution while others do not?
An ethnographic analysis of organizational culture can explain how and why certain norms are
framed, interpreted, and implemented by IO officials. IR scholars describe a case of unsuccessful

28

For those interviewees who gave their consent, I have attached their full names or exact titles to their
quotations. Otherwise, I have provided general descriptions of each interviewee’s position and department.
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norm diffusion as “the dog that didn’t bark.”29 The case of the diffusion of human rights at the
World Bank is more precisely a case of the “dog that didn’t—at least initially—bark.” My
empirical research investigates why human rights norms have been historically rejected by the
Bank and have only recently moved closer toward being adopted and internalized. It is important
to study these cases in order to identity the conditions of possibility for the internalization of
norms within IOs.
I contend that the conditions under which norms are internalized by IO officials are
shaped by how the norms are framed. In particular, the degree of “legalization” of human rights
norms influences whether staff adopt and internalize them. The extent to which legalizing human
rights impedes or facilitates internalization will depend on the organizational culture.
My study departs from conventional writing on legalization, including its definition and
its strategic value for implementing human rights. When legal scholars discuss “legalization,”
they often refer to the definition used in recent IR literature: as “a particular form of
institutionalization characterized by three components: obligation, precision, and delegation.”30
According to this definition, legalization describes “a particular set of characteristics that
institutions may (or may not) possess.”31 This conception is more applicable to an institutional
regime or arrangement (e.g., European Community law or WTO agreements), rather than the
structure or status of a specific norm within an institution.
I would like to focus on a different aspect of legalization—the extent to which norms are
perceived as having a “legal” status, often in relation to an existing legal system (e.g., the
29

Jeffrey T. Checkel, Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe, 43 INT’L STUD.
Q. 83, 86 (1999).
30
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 401 (2000). See also JUDITH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (2001).
31
Id.
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international human rights regime). In other words, to what degree are norms conceived as
“legal” norms (rather than moral, cultural, or professional norms, for instance)? This
understanding of legalization addresses the relationship between a norm and its legal expression,
and whether “legal norms, as a type, operate differently from any other kind of norms.”32 With
respect to human rights (the focus of my study), these norms could be framed as moral or
political concepts, as well as legal concepts. Amartya Sen critiques “the entirely law-dependent
views of human rights” and argues that they be defined as ethical rather than legal claims.33 He
believes that “human rights can have influence without necessarily depending on coercive legal
rules.”34 Going one step further, there are instances when a law-dependent view of human rights
can hinder its influence.
This leads us to an assessment of the strategic value of human rights legalization.35 In the
past few decades, there has been a trend towards the legalization of human rights and
international institutions in general.36 Legal scholars have emphasized the benefits of
legalization, which “tends to bolster the credibility of normative commitments, increase
compliance with international norms, and provide a highly rationalized mode of clarifying and
resolving interpretive disagreements.”37 Yet there are costs associated with human rights
legalization, particularly when it occurs in institutional environments that value non-legal
principles or seek non-legal goals (such as respect for moral values like dignity). For example,
32

Martha Finnemore, Are Legal Norms Distinctive?, 32 INT’L L. & POL. 699, 701 (2000).
Amartya Sen, Human Rights and the Limits of Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2913, 2916-17 (2006).
34
Id. at 2921. Sen further elaborates on this argument in Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of Human
Rights, PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS (2005).
35
See Jack Donnelly, The Virtues of Legalization, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 67 (Saladin Meckled-García &
Basak Çali eds., 2006).
36
Derek P. Jinks, The Legalization of World Politics and the Future of U.S. Human Rights Policy, 46 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 357, 360 (2002).
37
Id. at 361.
33
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during the creation of human rights commissions in post-authoritarian regimes in the 1990s,
there were attempts “to detach human rights from their legal moorings and redefine them as a
generalized language of public morality.”38 Citing the harmful consequences of overlegalization,
Laurence Helfer advocates for a cost-benefit view of legalization in his case study of the
Caribbean backlash against human rights regimes.39 Although Helfer adopts the IR definition of
legalization defined above and applies it to human rights treaties rather than norms within
institutions, he raises important questions about the usefulness of legalization in particular
contexts.40
In examining why legal norms could have distinctive effects in certain institutional
contexts but not others, Martha Finnemore notes that “[a]n organization staffed mostly by
lawyers is likely to find legal norms more persuasive than other kinds of norms and to give them
special weight. . . . If economists (or members of some other profession) dominated policy
making, we would expect norms of that profession, and not legal norms, to be particularly
powerful.”41 Finnemore’s example applies aptly to the case of the World Bank.
My research demonstrates that legalizing human rights would not be an effective strategy
for their adoption at the Bank. Framing human rights norms in legal terms may limit their
persuasiveness and impede their internalization. This is because of the dominance of economics
and the marginality of lawyers and legal frames within the Bank’s organizational culture, as I
further describe in Part III. Thus a key condition for the internalization of human rights norms is
38

See Richard Ashby Wilson, Is the Legalization of Human Rights Really the Problem? Genocide in the
Guatemalan Historical Clarification Commission, in THE LEGALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 81,
84.
39
Laurence Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth
Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002).
40
Id.
41
Finnemore, supra note 32, at 704.
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finding an institutional fit with the organizational culture. Finding an institutional fit requires that
norms become vernacularized so that they resonate with pre-existing understandings. This
involves “a dynamic process of matchmaking.”42 Proponents of a norm should act strategically—
e.g., through norm framing, cuing, or persuasion—in order to ensure congruence with the
organizational culture.
Looking Beyond Member States
My empirical study demonstrates that institutions can have relative autonomy when
member states hold competing preferences and do not reach consensus. In these circumstances,
IO officials have discretion and can significantly influence how the institution behaves. While
the Bank’s member states cast a shadow over the Bank, what has been underemphasized is how
much decision-making autonomy the agency has in pushing issues forward under their radar.
One can analyze the relationship between the Bank and member states by applying a
principal-agent model that includes multiple principals. The multiple-principals problem is an
extension of the traditional model, which assumes that principals and agents are unitary actors.43
Multiple principals may hold competing preferences and may be unable to effectively exert
oversight over the agent. Because oversight is costly, they are often forced to delegate authority.
This leaves the agent with considerable independence.44 Bureaucratic drift occurs when an
agency makes decisions or implements policies that diverge from the goals preferred by the

42

Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change
in Asian Regionalism, 58 INT’L ORG. 239, 243 (2004).
43
Richard W. Waterman & Kenneth J. Meier, Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?, J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 173, 181 (1998).
44
See id.; Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203,
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principals.45 Bureaucratic drift is particularly common in a multiple principals situation since a
conflict of interests among warring principals may prevent them from agreeing on common goals
and exerting oversight over the agency.46 This is often the case in an international institution,
where there is a “long chain of delegation” from the principals (or member states) to the IO
agent.47
The World Bank represents a multiple-principals problem, where member governments
serve as principals that collectively form the Board of Executive Directors. The Board is
composed of 24 Executive Directors who represent countries or country groups.48 Under the
Bank’s Articles of Agreement, the Board serves as the institution’s policy-making organ while
the President and senior management are responsible for operational, administrative, and
organizational issues.49 The Executive Directors thus serve as principals that delegate certain
tasks and responsibilities to agency officials. When member countries hold competing
preferences and cannot achieve consensus on a policy, there may be bureaucratic drift. Since it is
difficult for them to effectively exert oversight, the member countries are forced to delegate
authority to the agency officials. These dynamics have been confirmed by my ethnographic
research on the Bank. When studying its internal decision-making process, I discovered that
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employees operate quite independently from the Board. Certain sensitive management issues are
carried out without Board approval or involvement. The Board’s limited influence is in part due
to the short tenure of its members and its protocol of reaching almost all decisions by consensus.
An institutional constraint that favors agency autonomy is the short time horizon of
Board members as compared to that of the Bank President. Most Executive Directors serve for
just one or two two-year terms, whereas the President’s tenure can be at least 5 years or more if
he or she is reelected. Roughly a third of the Board members change each year. As a result, the
Directors’ knowledge of the history and practice of the institution is quite narrow.50 According to
an interview by Catherine Caufield with former Director Moíses Naím, “It is impossible, even
for the few of them that have a good prior understanding of the institution, to master the
overwhelming array of complex issues on which they are supposed to develop an independent
opinion.”51 Naím further explains that the Directors end up relying on the guidance of
management because they are “no match for a usually brilliant group of professionals with
decades of experience at the Bank.”52
Given the different time horizons of the President and the Executive Directors, the
President can incrementally introduce changes that will not be perceived as too radical by Board
members. This is because they have a limited institutional memory and, as multiple principals,
cannot effectively exert oversight over the President. Former President James Wolfensohn
adopted an incremental strategy for introducing changes during his second five-year term. By
this time, he had served the Bank longer than any Board member and was able to get a lot more
50
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done as compared to his first few years in office. Wolfensohn treated the Board in the following
manner:

[I]f you make the assumption to the Board that this is the way you operate, you
very rarely get challenged. . . . So if you can proceed in the institution with a set of
assumptions that you are doing things in the way they should be done, . . . you can
incrementally do a tremendous amount. Because it’s unlikely that anyone will
challenge you. Because they think that maybe this is the way the Bank should
operate. So I got a lot of things done incrementally without coming to the Board
for big policy decisions. I knew that if I went to the Board on many of the policy
decisions, [I’d] run into a hell of a lot of problems.53
Wolfensohn adopted this incremental strategy when pushing forward his corruption agenda. He
noted that by the time he had left, he was spending about six or seven million dollars a year on
corruption, although he had never presented a policy to the Board.54
Another important reason for why the Board lacks significant power over Bank
management and staff is that it historically only operates by consensus (with few exceptions).
The Board has historically been deeply divided over the issue of human rights. Some member
states like China and Saudi Arabia are highly opposed to an explicit human rights agenda that
would include the protection of civil and political rights (which they view as a reflection of
“Western” values). Others like India and Brazil (middle-income countries that are responsible for
a substantial portion of the Bank’s revenue) are afraid that human rights would increase
transaction costs for loans.55 Among countries that moderately support a human rights agenda,
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there is disagreement over what it would look like. Should the Bank adopt a rights-based
approach to development, a human rights operational policy, or a human rights impact
assessment that would limit possible human rights violations caused by projects? Among such a
diverse Board constituency, it is difficult to agree on a single approach. Because the Board
operates by consensus, disagreements on such issues as human rights have simply resulted in
inaction.
Since Bank officials have recognized the unlikelihood of getting Board support for a
human rights agenda, they have avoided proposing it for fear of a backlash against the issue if
they tried and failed to gain approval. Instead, internal advocates are introducing sensitive topics
like human rights not through Board approval but by making incremental changes in
operations.56 In other words, they are supporting a strategy that is under the radar screen of
member states.
II. THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE WORLD BANK
Over the past two decades, NGOs and internal advocates have pressured the Bank to
introduce a human rights agenda in the institution. One would expect the Bank to have been
swayed by this pressure along with the growing trend among corporations and development
agencies to address human rights more openly. Yet it has not. Many scholars have cited legal
reasons for why the Bank has not adopted human rights norms. In the first section below, I
clarify and describe the uncertainty over the Bank’s human rights obligations under international
law. I then analyze legal restrictions in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement that have historically
served as the major obstacle to the Bank’s direct engagement in human rights. However, I argue
56
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that legal constraints are insufficient reasons and that internal factors have played a major role.
Failed efforts at reform by internal advocates suggest the critical role of bureaucratic obstacles in
impeding human rights adoption. After describing these internal campaigns and their inability to
produce institutional change, I discuss the most recent attempt at reform—the 2006 Legal
Opinion on Human Rights by a former General Counsel. Its failure to generate momentum
among staff or create substantive changes in policy was in part due to questions over its legal
status. As I further explain below, there was uncertainty over whether the opinion constitutes an
official World Bank legal opinion because it had not been requested by the Board nor submitted
to the Board for approval. Yet despite the opinion’s uncertain legal status, members of the Legal
Department did not or even refused to circulate the opinion due to internal conflict within the
department over value-laden issues like human rights.

The Bank’s Obligations Under International Law
What does international law say about the Bank’s responsibilities with respect to human
rights? Does the Bank have an obligation to ensure that its projects, programs, and internal
policies are consistent with international human rights standards, and that its activities do not
facilitate human rights abuses? Does it have a responsibility to promote human rights in its
member states?
In order to address these questions, the first, most imporant issue to explore is the extent
to which the Bank as an international organization is bound by rules of customary international
law beyond its charter, including customary international law norms on human rights. There is a
20

debate over this question, as there is over what constitutes customary international law on human
rights.
The Bank functions as an international body with legal personality due to “the nature of
the specific powers granted under [its] Articles (notably the power to conclude agreements
governed by international law, and the provisions establishing their relationship with other
international organizations), their entitlement to specified privileges and immunities, and the fact
that they operate extensively within the international sphere. . . .”57 According to legal scholars,
the Bank’s status as an international legal person implies its role as both a subject and object of
international responsibilities and obligations, possibly including obligations incumbent upon the
organization under international agreements and customary international law.58
Because international organizations cannot become parties to human rights treaties as
states can, they are not directly bound by treaties. Yet, according to the International Court of
Justice, international organizations can be bound by obligations under general principles of
international law59 and capable of possessing international rights and duties.60 IOs are also bound
by jus cogens, or peremptory norms of international law such as the prohibition against
genocide.61 In addition, the Bank has obligations as a specialized agency of the United Nations.62
The Bank must respect the purposes and principles in the U.N. charter, including “the human
57
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rights purposes as stated in Article 55, as elaborated in the [Universal Declaration on Human
Rights] and the body of international human rights law built upon it.”63 It must also give “due
regard” for decisions of the U.N. Security Council, although it is not required to follow the
recommendations of the U.N.’s specialized human rights agencies.64
The second issue with regard to the Bank’s obligations under international law is whether
the institution has any obligations vis-à-vis its members. Because only some of its member states
are parties to particular human rights agreements, the Bank’s responsibilities would vary with
respect to different members. There is a debate regarding whether the Bank should go as far as
enforcing states’ treaty obligations through loan conditionalities or should just implement them
through technical assistance.65
Finally, there is the issue of what role, if any, international financial institutions (IFIs)
like the Bank should play in the progressive development of international law—e.g., by
promoting human rights in development. While international conferences, such as the 1993
Vienna World Conference on Human Rights and the 2000 Millennium Summit, have recognized
the interdependence between human rights and development,66 the rules of customary
international law in this area are still subject to dispute.
In summary, the international legal obligations of the Bank with respect to human rights
are a matter of dispute among legal scholars. The institution has skirted most of these arguments
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and instead focused on its limited mandate under its Articles of Agreement, whose interpretation
has become the locus of contention among Bank staff, advocates, and policymakers.67
The Bank’s Articles of Agreement
In addressing the question of why the Bank has not adopted a human rights agenda, many
scholars, policymakers, and advocates have focused on restrictions in the institution’s Articles of
Agreement, or founding constitution. The legal restrictions arise from two provisions: (i) Article
IV, Section 10; and (ii) Article III, Section 5(b), which place limits on the factors that staff can
consider in their decisions.68 Article IV, Section 10 prohibits political activity and permits only
economic considerations in decision-making:

The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member;
nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the
member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to
their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighted impartially in order to
achieve the purposes stated in Article I.
Article III, Section 5(b) limits the factors that the Bank can consider in the granting of loans and
restricts political considerations:

The Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are
used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to
considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other
non-economic influences or considerations.
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These provisions have historically stymied the Bank’s explicit engagement with human rights,
particularly civil and political rights, which have been interpreted as “political considerations.”
As a result, Bank employees have claimed that their work can only indirectly promote human
rights.
The General Counsel’s office has provided the authoritative interpretation of the Articles
of Agreement from time to time with respect to human rights, including what is considered an
allowable “economic consideration” and a prohibited “political” one. The official interpretation
has evolved over time to reflect an incremental expansion of the Bank’s mandate and a multifaceted view of development, including not only its economic dimensions but also its political,
social, and cultural ones.69 Former General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata authored the most
influential opinions, which expanded the Bank’s mandate and acknowledged the centrality of
human rights within development work:

While the Bank is prohibited from being influenced by political considerations, its
staff increasingly realize that human needs are not limited to the material “basic
needs” often emphasized in the 1970s. . . . [N]o balanced development can be
achieved without the realisation of a minimum degree of all human rights . . . .70
In the past two decades, Shihata’s opinions and memos have provided legal room for the Bank’s
involvement in areas that were once deemed as too political, such as legal and judicial reform
and anti-corruption efforts. Yet human rights, especially certain civil and political rights, have
still been considered too political for the Bank to directly address in its work. While restrictions
in the Articles of Agreement have continued to serve as a legal obstacle to human rights

69
70

DARROW, supra note 10, at 152.
IBRAHIM SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD: SELECTED ESSAYS 133 (1991).

24

adoption, bureaucratic obstacles have been more critical in impeding internal efforts at reform.
Efforts at Reform and Reasons for Failure
Institutional memory points to the early 1990s as one of the first internal campaigns to
integrate human rights into operational work. Leading this initiative was an interdisciplinary
working group of operational staff from the African region. The initiative was framed as part of a
new institutional focus on good governance as a key ingredient for development.71 While the
working group organized a number of brown bag lunches, workshops, and symposia, it became
inoperative in the mid-late 1990s. One reason was that many of the group members became very
busy with their work on governance and corruption, which had become a priority at the
institution. In addition, some of the senior officials who had previously supported the working
group had retired or moved to other departments. Without support from senior staff, it was
difficult for the working group members to invest resources in human rights research and
education. This changed by the late 1990s.
In 1995, James Wolfensohn became President of the Bank and ushered in an era of more
open dialogue on human rights. According to Wolfensohn, it took about three to four years to
educate staff that human rights was an important issue within the context of the Bank’s work.72
Under his leadership, the Bank published its first official report on human rights, which
recognized the institution’s role in promoting and protecting human rights but stopped short of
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stating that it had an international legal obligation to do so.73 Since the report’s publication in
1998, Bank documents and speeches have periodically mentioned human rights, although the
Bank’s Board of Executive Directors has continued to oppose its official incorporation into
institutional policy.74 President Wolfensohn recognized the unlikelihood of getting the Board to
spearhead a human rights agenda since it was and remains deeply divided over the issue. Instead
of consulting with the Board, Wolfensohn and senior management appealed to employees to try
to build support within the institution.
The momentum for a potential human rights strategy began in 2002. On May 2nd of that
year, the Bank organized an all-day internal workshop entitled “Human Rights and Sustainable
Development: What Role for the Bank?,” which was attended by about 100 employees from
across the institution. The purpose of the workshop was to increase staff awareness of human
rights and to discuss possible implications for Bank operations. In a plenary address to the
workshop, President Wolfensohn announced that the mood was changing and it was time to take
the words “human rights” out of the closet.75 He then invited a number of senior staff to lead an
institution-wide task force on human rights and draft a strategy paper that he could present at the
Bank’s next Annual Meetings.76
Coordinated by the Social Development Department, the task force included staff from
several departments including Legal, Human Development, External Affairs, Sustainable
Development, and Poverty Reduction. Including representatives from a variety of departments
73
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was critical since it allowed for cross-disciplinary dialogue and prevented one department from
co-opting the agenda. On June 2003, the task force presented a background report on human
rights to the Board’s Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE). The report reviewed
the Bank’s existing work in support of human rights and identified the difficulties of adopting a
human rights policy.77 Although it recommended that the Bank merely adopt human rights
principles (instead of a policy or a rights-based approach), the committee ultimately did not
approve the report.78 The committee and senior management felt that they were not ready to
approve a report on such a controversial issue. According to one task force member, although
senior officials had reviewed multiple drafts, they just “got cold feet” about passing a paper on
human rights and began to “backpedal.”79 They called for more background studies and analysis
before progressing any further on a strategy.
Following the committee’s meeting, Wolfensohn assigned the human rights portfolio to a
managing director in charge of human development issues—Mamphela Ramphele.80 During the
fall of 2003 and early 2004, Ramphele and her senior advisor Alfredo Sfeir-Younis pursued a
decentralized approach with regional human rights focal points, who were given the latitude to
determine how they would address the issue. Some regions did not follow up on this request,
while others simply wrote stocktaking reports of their human rights-related activities. There was
little coordination among the regions, with Ramphele only chairing a couple of meetings with the
new focal points and senior management.
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The “crescendo” of this phase of internal human rights advocacy occurred in March
2004.81 On the first of the month, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary
Robinson and New York University law professor Philip Alston convened a conference on the
law school’s campus on “Human Rights and Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement.”82
The conference featured a keynote address by Wolfensohn and presentations by a number of
senior officials, including the recently appointed General Counsel Roberto Dañino who outlined
what would later become his legal opinion on human rights. But the momentum seemed to stop
soon thereafter. Aside from the publication of a book based on the conference, there was no
substantive follow-up and no major resources devoted to continuing this initiative. In addition,
Mamphela Ramphele resigned from the Bank in April 2004.
Why did the flurry of activity over human rights between 2002 and 2004 not result in the
adoption of a human rights strategy? It would seem that many key ingredients were in place for
human rights norm adoption and eventual internalization: (i) support from the President to
develop a strategy that would be presented to the Board; (ii) the appointment of a managing
director to oversee the human rights portfolio; and (iii) an interdisciplinary task force with
representatives from different departments. So why didn’t the task force and the Ramphele-led
initiative succeed in gathering internal support and pushing through a Bank strategy on human
rights?
Those familiar with the events, including several task force members, cite a number of
reasons for why the task force and region-based initiative failed to capitalize on the growing
momentum towards human rights norm adoption. These reasons include excessive caution and
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backpedaling on the part of senior management and the Board’s Committee on Development
Effectiveness; internal resistance to collaborating with civil society organizations; and a lack of
resources to carry out the requisite activities for increasing staff awareness on human rights.
Wolfensohn himself admits that he should have placed more emphasis on the issue of human
rights during his tenure:

The thing that I thought I had done was to establish the issue of human rights as
being an important issue for people at the Bank. If I didn’t go far enough, then I
made a mistake. . . . Maybe in retrospect, I should’ve made a bigger deal of it and
tried to put it within the context of some legal framework or some administrative
framework.83
Moreover, there were criticisms that the task force leaders were too theoretical and
underemphasized the concrete practical steps that were needed to push the agenda forward.84
Some thought Ramphele lacked the political capital and Bank experience to influence senior
management. Even though she was a managing director, many employees viewed her as an
outsider since she had only joined the Bank in 2000, and as lower in status than the two other
managing directors since she was responsible for the “soft” issues like human development.85
Yet based on my interviews, the most significant factor behind the failure of internal
attempts between 2002 and 2004 was a clash of expertise. Task force members complained of
the difficulty of reaching consensus among people from different sectors and disciplinary
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backgrounds, who held divergent views on how to define human rights and interpret them with
respect to Bank operations.86 The theoretically oriented people (who emphasized the
indivisibility of human rights) clashed with the more pragmatically minded, who were mainly
concerned with operational issues and the need to make trade-offs between different rights in
projects with limited budgets. One employee intimately familiar with the events explained that
the failure to bring about a human rights strategy was not due to resistance from the Board or
senior management but rather “turf battles, and just the difficulty of doing something like this in
such a multi-sectoral organization.”87 Amid internal disputes, the task force failed to build a
constituency among staff in support of its mission.
The final piece that was missing was support from the Legal Department, which is
surprising given the centrality of the Articles of Agreement in determining the Bank’s role with
respect to human rights. Although the task force included a lawyer from the department, he did
not consult with the General Counsel and did not consider himself the department’s official
representative on the issue of human rights. Other members of the Legal Department felt shut out
from the process by task force members.88 In the fall of 2003, when Ramphele led a
decentralized approach with region-based human rights focal points, the Legal Department was
only belatedly included in discussions. Finally, there were turf wars between the Legal
Department and the regional departments, which wanted to remain in control of the human rights
agenda and not cede it to the lawyers.
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While the turf wars continued, the Legal Department’s role in discussions over human
rights expanded following the appointment of a new General Counsel, Roberto Dañino, in late
2003. Dañino championed the human rights agenda over the next two years and paved the way
for recent efforts by members of the Legal Department (discussed in Part IV).
The 2006 Legal Opinion on Human Rights
On January 31, 2006, on his last day as the Bank’s General Counsel, Roberto Dañino
dropped a bomb on the desks of his staff (or more accurately in their computers).89 Members of
the Legal Department woke up that morning to an email from Dañino with an attachment
entitled, “Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank.”90 Its topic was not
a surprise to many given that Dañino had been a champion of this issue during his tenure at the
Bank and was credited with opening up space inside and outside the institution for a dialogue on
human rights. He set up a small working group on human rights only one month after he had
arrived at the Bank. Over the next two years, he strengthened the Bank’s relationship to the
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and gave a number of speeches on the
important role of human rights in the Bank’s work.
The closing statement from Dañino’s legal opinion reads:

The Articles of Agreement permit, and in some cases require, the Bank to
recognize the human rights dimensions of its development policies and activities
since it is now evident that human rights are an intrinsic part of the Bank’s
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mission.91
This view represents a significant departure from the previous official interpretation by former
General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata.92 Both Shihata and Dañino interpreted provisions in the
Articles that have a bearing on human rights, particularly those that prohibit political activity and
permit only economic considerations in decision-making.93 While Shihata was the first to
acknowledge the relevance of human rights for the Bank, he never went so far as saying (as
Dañino did) that there are instances where a country’s human rights violations should be taken
into account. He also did not recognize the indivisibility of rights, as he noted that “there are
limits on the possible extent to which the World Bank can become involved with human rights of
civil and political nature. . . .”94 Moreover, Shihata applied a strict definition of economic factors
as those that have a “‘direct and obvious’ economic effect relevant to the Bank’s work.”95
Dañino called for a “purposive” interpretation of the Articles, “examined against the
backdrop of the current international legal regime and the evolving understanding of
development.”96 He explained that “there are instances in which the Bank may take human rights
into account, and others in which it should. Indeed, there are some activities which the Bank
cannot properly undertake without considering human rights.”97 Dañino then outlined three
increasing levels of Bank involvement in human rights. First, he explained that the Bank may
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take a supportive role in assisting a country in fulfilling its own human rights legal obligations
(when it expresses its wish to do so), provided that these commitments “have an economic
impact or relevance.”98 Second, when a country has violated or not fulfilled its obligations, the
Bank should take them “into consideration,” again provided that they have an economic impact.
So far, Dañino’s opinion does not stray very far from those of Shihata.
When describing the third level of Bank involvement, Dañino differed from Shihata in
not requiring any economic impact and stating that the Bank should do something in extreme
cases. He stated, “[I]n egregious situations, where extensive violations of human rights reach
pervasive proportions, the Bank should disengage if it can no longer achieve its purposes.”99 This
is a major departure from Shihata’s view. Yet the opinion did not clarify what are considered to
be “extensive violations” or “pervasive proportions.” Without this further clarification, there is a
danger of ad hoc disengagement based on political factors.
Dañino highlighted a number of other significant issues in his opinion: (i) the
indivisibility of rights (“the Bank should not make a distinction between different types of
human rights” (e.g., economic, social, and cultural rights over civil and political rights);100 (ii)
the existence of economic evidence that establishes a correlation between human rights and
economic growth;101 (iii) a recognition of norms that traverse national boundaries (e.g.,
“corruption, corporate or financial crimes, money laundering, corruption, environmental hazards,
war crimes and crimes against humanity”);102 and (iv) a transformation of the concept of
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sovereignty with relation to human rights.103 On the last point, the opinion cited customary
international law on human rights and argued that “[t]he balance [between state sovereignty and
human rights] has . . . shifted in favor of protecting human rights, with the concept of
sovereignty having itself been transformed by the evolution of human rights standards and the
pursuit of human rights enforcement at all levels of international law in global, regional and
domestic fora.”104 Despite this statement, Dañino did not go as far as saying that international
organizations like the Bank are bound by international human rights law. The only subjects of
international human rights legal obligations, according to Dañino, are states.
Finally, the opinion reflected the role of the private sector in influencing developments
towards social responsibility at the Bank. Dañino argued that it is “standard practice” among
private banks to rely on an analysis of not only economic factors, but all factors that affect
investments, including social, environmental, and political ones.105 In his March 2004 speech at
NYU that formed the basis of this opinion, he further used the private sector as a model for the
Bank. He argued that the Bank, “although a development institution, is primarily a financial
institution. . . . [L]ike its private sector counterparts, [the Bank must consider] . . . the
‘investment climate’ in the recipient country.”106 Moreover, in an October 2005 speech at the
Bank, Dañino compared his experience there with his work on Wall Street where, he explained,
commercial and investment banks are similarly supposed to make decisions based on economic
considerations alone. Yet he noted that these banks all have political risk units that analyze the
political impacts of investments on countries and the political realities of their borrowers. Thus,
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they recognize that political dimensions are relevant factors for decision-making. Dañino
concluded that since private banks consider political factors, “[w]hy should the Bank refuse to do
so?”107
The Opinion’s Uncertain Legal Status and Limited Impact
The 2006 legal opinion seemed to clear the way for the Bank’s adoption of human rights
norms. It removed a major obstacle—legal restrictions in the Articles of Agreement—that Board
members and employees had long cited as the reason why the Bank could not directly engage in
human rights. It also raised the status of Legal Department lawyers who had played a minimal
role in earlier initiatives within the Bank but were now in the position to lead internal discussions
over a possible human rights strategy.
Yet the opinion had a limited impact due to ambiguity over its legal status and a resulting
uncertainty over whether the Legal Department should circulate it as the Bank’s “official”
interpretation of its Articles. General Counsels customarily write legal opinions in response to a
request from the Board, which would then endorse them as official Bank opinions. In the case of
Dañino’s opinion, senior Bank management, rather than the Board, had asked Dañino for
guidance on the issue of human rights.
The opinion was not submitted to the Board because senior officials knew that the Board
was sharply divided over human rights and would very likely not endorse it.108 Dañino felt that it
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was not the right time to confront the Board on this issue. He stated that it was “impossible,” at
least at this point in time, to get a policy or opinion approved by the Board:

That’s the reason that I didn’t want to go to the Board. . . . Because if you go
there, [some of the Board members might try to] stop us. . . . And I knew for a fact
that we didn’t have a consensus [in the Board], so what’s the point in hitting a
brick wall? So I didn’t go there.109
The Board’s lack of endorsement of an opinion would be a public condemnation of internal
efforts to push a human rights agenda forward in the Bank. It may even result in a backlash by
Executive Directors, who may then become more vigilant in prohibiting any human rightsrelated initiative that they deem as contrary to the Bank’s mandate. Dañino and other senior
officials felt that it was best to operate “under the radar” with regard to controversial issues like
human rights.110
With little chance of the opinion being approved by the Board in the near future, it
currently has an uncertain legal status. Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement, the Executive
Directors have the authority to decide questions of interpretation of the Articles’ provisions.111
Legal opinions from the General Counsel are only intended to offer guidance to the Board in
deciding these questions. Yet, there is no precedent for how to treat opinions unapproved by the
Board and written by a General Counsel who has since departed.
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Among employees who had read the opinion, there was wide disagreement about its
status. A senior member of the Legal Department said it should be treated as “an internal matter,
part of an iterative process. . . . It’s considered as a source of advice for management, but not the
Board.”112 Some staff questioned the process by which it was drafted and its legitimacy as an
official Bank opinion. They claimed that it only represents Dañino’s personal opinion and does
not carry legal weight on an institutional level since the Board never requested the advice of the
General Counsel on this issue.113 According to a senior Bank lawyer, the unclear status of the
opinion put the Legal Department in a period of limbo.114
Despite the opinion’s uncertain legal status, there was still an opportunity for it to
provoke a discussion among staff about the role of human rights at the Bank—an issue that had
been taboo for many years. The opinion’s flexible interpretation of the Articles of Agreement
could have created an enabling environment for more explicit work on human rights. However,
the great majority of staff did not receive the opinion on January 31st when it was released, or on
any day thereafter. The opinion appeared in the inboxes of only the members of the Legal
Department and a selected number of vice-presidents and senior officials. While some of the
lawyers then forwarded the opinion to their colleagues in other departments, there remained (and
still remain) many staff that had not read the opinion, let alone knew that it existed even months
after its release. The Legal Department made no effort to circulate the document to the rest of the
staff and, even more remarkably, some lawyers obstinately refused to disclose its contents when
asked. Inquiring employees were told that it was the exclusive domain of the Legal Department
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and could not yet be shared to “outsiders,” referring to not only the press and NGOs but also
anyone in the Bank outside of the department.115 Nevertheless, NGOs were leaked a copy of the
opinion, which they subsequently posted on their websites.116
There is precedent for not disclosing opinions outside of the Bank. They are supposed to
remain internal only, although they are often leaked externally. Under the Bank’s disclosure
policy, the General Counsel cannot publicly release legal opinions without the Board’s
approval.117 The only prior occasion when opinions were externally released was the publication
of former General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata’s legal opinions and memoranda in a book.118 In this
case, Shihata “sought a special authorization from the Bank’s Executive Directors.”119 However,
the Bank’s disclosure policy does not prohibit opinions from being disclosed to staff outside the
Legal Department.120
So why wasn’t the 2006 opinion circulated more widely across the Bank? In addition to
the opinion’s questionable legal status, my research points to another underlying reason for why
members of the Legal Department did not or even refused to circulate the opinion—internal
conflict within the department over value-laden issues like human rights. In order to understand
this conflict, one must analyze the practices and status of lawyers and economists within the
bureaucracy as well as the clash of expertise within the Bank’s organizational culture.
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III. THE BANK’S ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
If legal constraints insufficiently account for the marginality of human rights at the Bank,
we must look inside the organization. One must examine the Bank’s organizational culture to
determine how bureaucratic obstacles have shaped the adoption and diffusion of human rights
norms. An organizational culture is “a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central
tasks of and human relationships within an organization.”121 It encompasses a range of factors,
including the formal goals of an organization, its mission, the prior experiences and personal
beliefs of employees, “the expectations of their peers, the array of interests in which their agency
is embedded, and the impetus given to the organization by its founders.”122 Organizations do not
have homogenous cultures, but multiple subcultures that may operate in conflict. This is the case
for the World Bank, where subcultures are based on such factors as employees’ disciplinary
backgrounds or the geographic regional unit in which they operate.
My study of the Bank analyzes its culture as a political process of constructing and
negotiating meanings, which are continuously contested. I uncover the formal characteristics of
an organization, including its management structure and operational policies.123 I also analyze
the informal characteristics such as power dynamics among staff and the Bank’s incentive
system, which emphasizes lending targets rather than results on the ground. Below I will briefly
describe the explicit and implicit goals and incentives that are relevant to human rights adoption.
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Processes of Norm Socialization
An organization has a sense of mission when it has a clearly defined direction and
principal goals behind its operations. The mission “confers a feeling of special worth on the
members, provides a basis for recruiting and socializing new members, and enables the
administrators to economize on the use of other incentives.”124 A strong sense of mission can
foster loyalty to the organization and camaraderie among staff, but can also favor the dominant
subculture and lead to resistance to new tasks that seem incompatible to it.125 Such new tasks and
programs may be given less resources or prominence within the organization as compared to
those supported by the dominant subculture.
The explicit mission of the Bank is poverty reduction, according to its Articles of
Agreement. Yet given the vagueness of this goal and its vulnerability to multiple interpretations,
the Bank has been accused of “mission creep” by those inside and outside the organization.
Mission creep refers to the shifting of activities away from an organization’s original mandate.126
One could distinguish between the Bank’s explicit mandate and multiple implicit mandates,
which can cover a range of poverty reduction-related issues. For example, when Bank
management has resisted issues like human rights (particularly certain civil and political rights),
it has defined them as outside the Bank’s mandate and thus not worthy of being part of the
organization’s work program. Within the institution and within employees themselves, there is
significant debate as to the core mission of the Bank and what activities can be considered
consistent with it.
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Processes of socialization condition employees as to what are the unstated assumptions
behind their work and what issues are taboo to discuss and/or work on. Socialization refers to “a
systematic means by which [organizations] bring new members into their culture.”127 It can
occur through recruitment procedures, training, informal conversations with peers, and rituals
that validate the organizational culture. Norm socialization processes inculcate employees with
the generally accepted values and expected behavior in an organization.
One mechanism by which socialization occurs is through incentives (both pecuniary and
nonpecuniary), which “tell people specifically what is valued and comparatively more important
in the particular setting and how, therefore, to allocate attention and effort among competing
objectives.”128 The Bank’s incentive system could be summed up in this statement: “The culture
of the Bank is getting a project to the Board. . . . You get your intellectual brownie points from
your peers in the Bank by saying that I have taken a 200 million dollar project to the Board in so
many months, and so many years. That’s what gives you standing.”129 While this incentive is not
explicitly stated in staff manuals, it becomes part of the common knowledge of employees soon
after they join the Bank.
There are a number of problems with this incentive system, some of which are articulated
by an employee:

It’s very easy to measure money out the door but hard to assess your contribution
to results. How do you know that it was your project that achieved [a particular
result]? Also, managers move [to different departments] and there are big lags in
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things—people think you can change a country in two years, but you can’t. You
need to have a very sophisticated system for assessing your contribution to
development in your specific area. And that’s hard to do, and it’s hard to do it in
the time period where they can hold you accountable for that.130
Since projects often take many years to yield results, promotion is not tied to favorable long-term
outcomes. Rather, it is based on the approval of projects and the size of those projects in terms of
money loaned. In addition, it is often difficult to find a causal relationship between a manager’s
actions and a project’s long-term effects, given that there are many external factors (e.g., the
political conditions on the ground) that are also at play. James Q. Wilson refers to bureaucracies
like the Bank as “procedural organizations,” where the ways in which staff “go about their job is
more important than whether doing those jobs produces the desired outcomes.”131 In other
words, only outputs rather than outcomes can be observed in such organizations.
What are the indirect results of the Bank’s incentive system on policy compliance by
employees? Given my interest in human rights, I have focused on the Bank’s safeguard policies,
which are designed to avoid or mitigate detrimental impacts of Bank activities and ensure that
operations are financially, socially, and environmentally sound. While there is no safeguard
policy on human rights, many of the existing policies address human rights-related issues. They
include cultural property, environmental assessment, forests, indigenous peoples, involuntary
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resettlement, natural habitats, and safety of dams.132 Although employees are required to apply
the policies in borrower countries, they do not consistently do so in practice.133
While the Bank promotes its safeguard policies as indicative of its concern for
environmental and social goals, its implicit incentive system suggests that these goals are not
primary. In fact, most employees perceive the policies as impediments to lending because they
add constraints to tasks and thereby reduce efficiency and opportunities for promotion. Policies
may also create a perverse incentive: For instance, staff may avoid projects that would benefit
indigenous peoples (by redesigning projects in areas unpopulated by them) so that they would
not be required to complete additional time-consuming and costly tasks under the Bank’s
Indigenous Peoples Policy.134 These tasks include the preparation of an indigenous peoples
development plan and the scheduling of public consultations.135 Because task teams (the
operational groups that prepare and supervise projects) have limited budgets and a restricted
timetable, they have an incentive to minimize the number of policies that they have to comply
with.136 Policies may serve more as maximum ceilings rather than as minimum standards.
There is discretion among project managers as to how to apply safeguard policies and
how to balance compliance with other goals. Some managers who are sympathetic to human
rights and view them as part of the Bank’s mandate are more careful in applying the policies in
their projects. Yet, they still face pragmatic dilemmas when trying to balance competing
132
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principles. One employee noted that “[i]n the day-to-day operations, very often principles may
contradict each other. For example, we want [projects] to be participatory and for people to have
a say and be involved, but at the same time we want projects to go very fast.”137 Employees also
face ethical dilemmas in their work. They may be internally divided over how to balance their
support for human rights-related concerns with their allegiance to the implicit Bank goal of
quickly approving and carrying out projects with the least interference and complications. One
lawyer that I spoke to described a dilemma he is facing in an African country that has one of the
largest AIDS problems in the world but also one of the most repressive regimes.138 Should the
Bank stop lending to the country because it has unfairly locked up dissidents, even if it means
closing down its AIDS project that is significantly helping its poor population? Employees are
not given guidance as to how to balance competing priorities like these and are not encouraged to
discuss ethical issues.139
The “Knowledge Bank”
Within the institution, knowledge is considered to be the currency of value, and having a
Ph.D. is more the norm than the exception. The Bank’s collection of knowledge, which it has
gathered over many years of experience advising developing countries, is its comparative
advantage over commercial banks and private investors and gives it authority over other
development agencies.140 Its research departments are unparalleled in the field of development—
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few, if any, universities have the depth and breadth of practical experience that is housed in the
Bank. In the mid-1990s, former President Wolfensohn began to define it as a “knowledge bank,”
focused on not only lending money but also the production and transmission of developmentoriented ideas, analysis, and advice to client countries.141 By doing so, “existing products and
services [were] redefined as knowledge assets, or augmented with knowledge of how they are
used.”142 The accumulation and dissemination of knowledge on development is now considered
a complementary goal to the promotion of economic growth.143 In-house research can, at least in
theory, be integrated into the Bank’s everyday operations and made available to policymakers in
client countries; in other words, ideas can be put into practice.144
How does knowledge circulate within the Bank and what are the conditions under which
it is produced? In order to answer this question, it is important to analyze the Bank’s
management structure, which significantly shapes the processes of knowledge production and
circulation. The Bank is divided into two major groups: the operations units and the network
units. The operations units are responsible for carrying out development projects on the ground
and maintaining relations with member countries. They are divided into six geographic regional
units, whose cultures are quite distinct. The operations units are further sub-divided into five
thematic areas, including Sustainable Development, Human Development, and Infrastructure.145
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The network units form the research arm of the Bank and offer advisory services to the
operations staff in the form of reports and referrals to experts. These units cover the same
thematic topics as the operations units but are not sub-divided geographically.
Since 1997, the Bank has operated under a matrix organizational structure, with
overlapping geographic and functional units and parallel reporting relationships that are intended
to promote knowledge management. Matrix structures, which became fashionable in the late
1970s and early 1980s, feature a diffusion of responsibility along multiple lines of command.146
For instance, an employee in operations may be concurrently responsible to bosses in three units:
a country management unit (based in the field), at least one network or thematic research unit in
the headquarters (e.g., poverty, the public sector, the environment, or infrastructure), and a sector
management unit. The sector management unit is the department where the employee sits in the
headquarters, and corresponds to a particular geographic region and thematic area (e.g., Latin
American Sustainable Development or African Health and Education). It is also the unit
responsible for an operations employee’s performance appraisal and promotion (although it also
receives comments from the other units).
When the Bank holds a staff orientation training session, it devotes a considerable
amount of time to the goals, functions, and benefits of “the matrix environment.”147 One of the
primary objectives of the matrix is to facilitate knowledge seeking and sharing through
collaboration and teamwork among units. Knowledge sharing can enhance the quality of Bank
assistance. For example, operations employees are expected to maintain strong affiliations with
Development, Operations Policy and Country Services, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, and
Sustainable Development.
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multiple thematic groups, which provide cross-country comparisons and best practice examples
on a particular issue like developing a transport sector strategy. One advantage of a matrix
structure is that “[i]ts multiple information channels allow[] the organization to capture and
analyze external complexity.”148 Such complexity includes interdependent activities and the need
to respond quickly and flexibly to changing environments. In addition, an integration of
geographical and functional groups can, in theory, promote innovative ideas and cooperation
among staff.
However, the matrix system has grown unpopular among many employees who question
whether it achieves its stated objectives. The material from the staff orientation training session
boasts that the matrix structure enables staff to “balance potentially conflicting objectives.” This
seems to be a grave problem in practice as employees find it difficult and confusing to report to
multiple bosses, particularly when the bosses assign them conflicting tasks. Management
scholars have reiterated this criticism. They have observed that “the proliferation of channels [in
a matrix] create[] informational logjams, . . . and overlapping responsibilities produce[] turf
battles and a loss of accountability.”149 The training session material itself admits to some of the
challenges of the matrix—e.g., ambiguous roles and reporting relationships, power struggles,
high levels of staff stress, and decision-making problems.
Moreover, in the case of the Bank, the matrix structure does not necessarily facilitate
cooperation among staff towards promoting innovation. A senior official who had recently
joined the institution observed that while the matrix is supposed to create a marketplace of ideas
that compete for influence, he is “not really sure that it functions as a perfect market, that the best
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ideas are winning.” He lamented that there is “a loss of resources being spent on running that
system.”150 Most of the new ideas come from people in the network, since those in operations are
too busy designing and running projects. Despite the matrix’s objective of collaboration between
network and operations units, there is an underlying tension between them. Operations
employees often complain that those in the network do not understand the day-to-day
responsibilities of managing projects and dealing with country governments, and, as a result,
their research is not always relevant to operational work.151
The network, which serves as a community of professionals united by a thematic work
program, is the source of new knowledge, although country knowledge gathered by operations
staff is also highly valued. The network’s centrality in the Bank’s management structure
indicates the importance of experts in this knowledge-based organization. With expert
knowledge given such a high priority in the Bank’s work program and management structure, it
is not surprising that it serves as an important factor in determining status among employees.
A Clash of Expertise
Staff behavior is shaped by a number of factors, including employees’ prior experience,
political ideology, personality characteristics, and professional or disciplinary background.152 It
is this last factor that I focus on because, based on my interviews and observations, it is one of
the strongest sources of identification among staff, as well as a basis for sharp internal division.
Having undergone specialized formal education in a discipline, employees derive much of their
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knowledge and skills from their professional background and are strongly influenced by
professional norms. This is especially true in an organization like the Bank where employees are
given a lot of discretion under operational rules to pursue often vaguely defined goals. In
addition, many employees perceive their disciplinary background as a key contributing factor in
determining their status and opportunities for career advancement within the organization.
Composed of multiple, often competing groups of professionals, the Bank’s
organizational culture is an “epistemic community,” a “network of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”153 Employees come from about 160 different
countries and include economists, political scientists, lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists,
environmentalists, financial analysts, and engineers, among others. The number of noneconomist social scientists has grown steadily over the past three decades, from about a dozen in
the 1970s and early 1980s to over 200 in 1998 (based on the number of people in the newly
established Social Development Network).154 At the same time, the number of engineers, once an
influential expert group at the Bank, has decreased. Thus, the dominance of a particular expertise
among staff has shifted over time.
Professional groups may exhibit competing preferences over goals for the organization,
including visions for what development means and how it can be achieved. They speak distinct
languages arising from their disciplinary training, which may impede conversation and
collaboration. In an analysis of policy debates at the Bank, a few employees observed:
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In DEC [the development economics research group], and among country
economists and country managers, talk revolves around quantification, statistical
significance, and formal models. Among operational staff, the grammar is
different—it revolves around usability, and among many of the social scientists,
around social and political change.155
Power relations between professional communities are apparent in turf wars, where departments
try to assert their authority and influence within the larger organization. Experts struggle over
who has authority and jurisdictional control over particular issues, such as human rights. One of
the sharpest divisions is between economists and non-economists, particularly lawyers. Within
the Bank, forms of expert knowledge are valued differently, with economic knowledge ranking
the highest.
The Prestige of Economists and the Dominance of Economics
The dominant subculture within the organization consists of economists because their
expertise is considered the most valuable to the Bank’s core work of promoting poverty
reduction and economic growth. They have an influence way beyond their numbers. Economists
comprise the majority of senior management positions (although they do not make up the
majority of staff), and their way of thinking prevails within the institution, including their
definition of development success. Moreover, the prestigious country director positions, which
are responsible for dialogue with country ministers and budget allocation to the sectoral units at
the headquarters, are most commonly held by economists. It is important to note, however, that
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there are different types of economists in the Bank, including neoclassical and institutionalist,
which also compete for authority.
Economists have their own prestigious research group (the development economics
group, or DEC), which hires top economists and recent doctorates, mostly from U.S. and British
universities. There is no comparable effort to recruit top members of other professions as there is
to recruit economists into DEC, and there is no serious career track for non-economists as there
is for economists.156 DEC economists produce high-quality academic papers that influence Bank
staff, public policymakers in member countries, and the academic community. Since employees
in operations rarely have enough time to write academic papers, and those in the network often
do not have an opportunity to research topics of their own choosing, DEC serves as an important
platform for the transmission of new ideas across the institution.157
The dominance of a single profession may be harmful for the Bank, as one senior
economist acknowledged:

In my view, the limitation of the Bank up to this point is that we’ve been wedded
to one discipline: economics. So fashions and trends and fads in that discipline
have affected the fashions and trends and fads of economic development at the
Bank. So why shouldn’t the fads and fashions of anthropology or political science
affect it?158
Non-economists often feel that they have to translate their writing and speech into economists’
language and quantify their observations in an effort to gain legitimacy for their ideas. Although
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they lack the theoretical training, they learn “a craft version” of the economics knowledge
system.159 What distinguishes the economics professional from the legal one, for example, is that
one can claim to be an economist without advanced training or licensing while once cannot claim
to be a lawyer without passing the bar exam.160 Staff with backgrounds other than economics
may even call themselves economists in order to gain status: I met a public sector specialist with
a public policy background who chose the title of political economist for this reason. This form
of “workplace assimilation” has discouraged informed debate among different disciplinary
perspectives and has created a sense of inferiority among some non-economists.161
The Status of Lawyers and the Legal Department
Lawyers do not typically serve as the intellectual leaders among staff or as key players in
policymaking and agenda-setting. The great majority of lawyers in the Bank are part of the Legal
Department, which is dominated by transactional lawyers who work on loan agreements and
advise staff on operational policies and law-related issues.162 Aside from a small number of
lawyers in operations who work on legal and judicial reform and other public sector projects,
lawyers typically do not serve as project team leaders and their participation in projects is usually
limited to technical legal tasks. Unlike economists, lawyers are not encouraged to spend their
time writing academic papers. Although the Legal Department has organized seminars in order
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to foster intellectual dialogue on legal topics (for example, a two-day Legal Forum in December
2005 and a seminar series with external academics), lawyers are mainly expected to be skilled in
a practitioner-based knowledge.163
The reputation of the Bank’s Legal Department has historically been at a higher level
than its current state and has shifted over time, often in line with the strength of leadership by the
General Counsel.164 The appointment and dismissal of the General Counsel is the responsibility
of the Bank’s President.165 The role of the General Counsel “may vary according to the
organization, the time period, and even the personalities involved.”166 When the Bank’s General
Counsel has played an influential role in the institution, there has been an opportunity for
lawyers within the Legal Department to go beyond such traditional duties as drafting loan
agreements, advising on the legal aspects of Bank operations, and contributing to the formulation
of and compliance with the Bank policies and procedures. They have at times served as
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policymakers, innovators, and institution-builders.167 For example, during the tenure of former
General Counsel Ibrahim Shihata, the Legal Department played a key role in designing the
Inspection Panel168 and launching the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).169 In addition, Shihata’s legal opinions on governance
and the rule of law paved the way for the introduction of legal and judicial reform projects into
the Bank’s agenda.170 The General Counsels since Shihata, as well as the Legal Departments that
they supervised, have played a much weaker role in Bank policymaking and institution-building.
Moreover, since Shihata there has been a high turnover of General Counsels, all of whom have
served less than five years as compared to Shihata’s fifteen year tenure.
The Legal Department’s increasingly weak leadership in Bank decision-making, as
compared to its status under Shihata, made it difficult for lawyers to play an influential role on
the issue of human rights. Moreover, because only lawyers from the Legal Department have full
access to legal opinions and internal memos, as well as the Bank’s law library, there has been
limited open dialogue between lawyers and the rest of the staff over legal opinions like the 2006
opinion on human rights.171 This has not always been the case. Legal opinions used to be
accessible to all Bank staff, but the practice ended when lawyers were feeling challenged by nonlawyers in operations, who had criticized some of their legal interpretations.172
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Finally, as is the case for any department or organization, there is internal conflict within
the Legal Department. There are lawyers who favor a conservative, formalistic interpretation of
legal issues, while others adhere to a progressive one. For example, the 2006 Legal Opinion on
Human Rights did not represent a unity of views within the department over the Articles of
Agreement. It was drafted by a small group of lawyers led by Dañino and was circulated within
the department for comment. While there was no vocal opposition, a number of lawyers
preferred a more cautious approach and later questioned its status as an official legal opinion.
Even after the opinion was released, there was resistance from within the department to
openly discussing and publicizing it. An informal group of lawyers approached the Deputy
General Counsel about ways to foster open dialogue within the department on the opinion’s
practical implications. The lawyers thought that this would be a good time to spark an internal
conversation about the role of human rights, which they considered long overdue. Yet they knew
that proposing a Bank-wide discussion would have been too radical at this time, since it may
have appeared to challenge the authority of the Legal Department. That is why they instead
suggested a safer alternative: a brown-bag lunch that would be restricted to members of the
department. (Brown-bag lunches are low-key events, as opposed to daylong seminars or
conferences.) Nonetheless, the Deputy General Counsel rejected this event as still being “too
controversial.”173 His resistance demonstrates a cautious attitude among members of the
department and an unwillingness by some lawyers to promote discussion of new ideas. Internal
conflict inhibited the Legal Department from presenting a united position on human rights and
leading staff in an open discussion in light of the recent opinion.
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IV. FRAMING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS TO ADAPT TO THE BANK’S CULTURE
How does the clash of expertise within the Bank’s organizational culture play out over
particular issues like human rights? More generally, how does it shape efforts at organizational
change? In Part II, I demonstrated that the failure of internal attempts to push forward a human
rights agenda at the Bank was in large part due to institutional obstacles, including internal
conflict over how to interpret and implement human rights norms. In this Part, I analyze how
different professional subcultures within the organization correspond to distinct interpretive
frames on human rights.174 Interpretive gaps between frames are critical obstacles in achieving
norm internalization in bureaucracies. In the context of the Bank, interpretive gaps refer to
differences between employees’ interpretations of human rights, including how they justify their
relevance with respect to the Bank’s mission and conceptualize their practical role in Bank
operations.
Of course, interpretive gaps are only one obstacle towards achieving norm
internalization. Other important factors include an appropriate staff incentive system to motivate
behavior, leadership by senior and middle management, and the investment of sufficient
resources to effectively institute policy changes. But I argue that particularly for the Bank, the
clash between interpretive frames is an underemphasized factor that has hindered the
development of a human rights consciousness among staff. After elaborating on the interpretive
gaps, I describe how members of the Legal Department are taking them into account in their
recent efforts to bring human rights into the Bank. Instead of legalizing human rights, they are
framing them in a way that appeals to economists. They are also pursuing an incremental
174
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approach to generate staff support for human rights while remaining under the radar of the Board
of Executive Directors.
Competing Interpretive Frames
Professional subcultures within the Bank hold distinct interpretive frames that shape their
understanding of issues and their preferred strategies for implementation.175 Members of
subcultures “routinely take actions on the basis of collective understandings to the group.”176
Their “distinctive worldview[s] and normative commitments” often derive from their
professional background, such as law or economics.
The two main interpretive rationales for understanding the value of human rights for the
Bank and development in general are the intrinsic and instrumental frames. Proponents of the
intrinsic frame view human rights as universal and indivisible, and they value their protection as
an end in itself. In contrast, proponents of the instrumental frame provide a functionalist rationale
for promoting human rights, as a means to an end. They measure the value of human rights based
on whether they enhance development effectiveness and make good business sense. As I
describe below, the two interpretive frames roughly correspond to distinct disciplinary ways of
thinking.177
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There are two subgroups within the intrinsic frame—the first emphasizes the legal
dimension of human rights while the second emphasizes their moral dimension. The first
subgroup defines human rights as legal obligations that derive their legitimacy from the
international human rights regime and, in particular, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.178 Members of this subgroup include, not surprisingly, many Bank lawyers, as well as
civil society advocates. They view rights as implying corresponding legal duties for state
governments. The Bank lawyers who are committed to this interpretation have expressed grave
concerns about any attempt to dilute the basic legal tenets of human rights and to “water down”
corresponding obligations.179 They insist that it “is essential . . . that efforts to integrate human
rights in development practice not compromise those key characteristics [of legal obligations and
duties] in the process, and risk the impoverishment of rights discourse and the undermining of
core values and objectives that human rights were conceived to realize.”180
The second subgroup of the intrinsic frame emphasizes the moral dimension of human
rights. Its members define rights as primarily ethical principles or moral imperatives, founded on
a conception of fundamental human dignity and a framework of common values. They often
advocate for a principles-based approach that focuses on ethics and social policy goals that are
not necessarily attached to legal standards. Members of this subgroup include many noneconomist social scientists, such as anthropologists and sociologists. One manifestation of this
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interpretive frame is the Bank’s 1999 report on Principles and Good Practice in Social Policy,
primarily drafted by employees in the Social Development Department.181
Adherents of the instrumental frame value human rights as a means of achieving
developmental objectives like economic growth. Given their pragmatic orientation, adherents of
this approach often mention possible trade-offs that must be made when implementing human
rights, especially in countries with limited resources. They prioritize the fulfillment of those
rights that achieve poverty reduction and economic growth. Because many economists typically
adhere to this interpretive frame, it holds a lot of weight in the institution.
Evaluating the Bank’s Recent Efforts
Following former General Counsel Roberto Dañino’s resignation in January 2006,
internal human rights advocates were left with a potentially influential legal opinion but no one
to champion it. The opinion remained in a sort of legal limbo as members of the Legal
Department disagreed on its status and hesitated to circulate it throughout the rest of the Bank.
Many members of the Legal Department were also reluctant to discuss it openly even within the
department. Nevertheless, a small number of lawyers continued their efforts to push the human
rights agenda forward. This section describes the institutional obstacles that the lawyers
encountered, and how they have redesigned their strategy to adapt to the Bank’s organizational
culture.
In late 2005 and 2006, an informal group of lawyers (many of whom would help draft the
2006 legal opinion) began to organize activities towards furthering the human rights agenda and
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taking an explicit approach to human rights. A prominent member of the group was a senior
lawyer from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was hired in October 2005 by the Legal
Department. His appointment was funded by the Nordic countries, which have demonstrated
strong support for a human rights agenda.182 On October 20, 2005, the Nordic countries
presented a working paper to former President Paul Wolfowitz entitled, “The World Bank and
Human Rights.”183 The paper discussed “why and how the human rights perspective should be
enhanced in the World Bank’s policies and operations with a view to reinforcing its development
and poverty eradication mission.”184 It opened a dialogue on human rights with former President
Wolfowitz and became part of a new Nordic and Baltic-sponsored initiative.
The initiative’s first order of business was the creation of the Justice and Human Rights
Trust Fund, whose purpose was “to provide effective support . . . to include human rights
considerations in the analytical and operational activities of the World Bank Group.”185 Its
proposed activities included empirical research, country case studies, and outreach across the
Bank through human rights education and training of operations staff. The trust fund would be
managed by the Legal Vice-Presidency, in cooperation with representatives from other Bank
units, and would have a minimum life span of five years.
Due to internal politics and a collapse in leadership following the resignation of
Wolfowitz, the Justice and Human Rights Trust Fund never launched as of publication of this
Article. Yet the deliberations that I witnessed in 2006 over the objectives and activities of the
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trust fund suggest possible ways to operationalize human rights norms in the Bank. While
designing the trust fund’s plan of action, the Bank lawyers faced resistance and had to revise
their approach to adapt to the Bank’s organizational culture. Their recent efforts address (or, at
times, sidestep) a number of the institutional obstacles that had plagued prior efforts to introduce
human rights. These include: the lack of a pragmatic orientation; the failure to conduct outreach
to staff in headquarters and the country offices; a lack of resources; and a fear by the Board and
senior management that human rights is too controversial and beyond the Bank’s mandate.
Framing Human Rights for Economists
The lawyers who helped draft the 2006 legal opinion realized that there was an
interpretive gap between their vision of human rights and that of the economists who dominate
the Bank. They spoke with employees in the headquarters and field offices who questioned the
added value of a human rights approach when compared to existing best practices, which already
incorporate a number of human rights principles. Throughout these discussions, they
encountered a need for more empirical work to demonstrate the causal links between human
rights and economic development. Some employees complained of a lack of clarity over what is
meant by a rights-based approach to development. Would it simply be a rhetorical repackaging
of existing practice? There was also a perception among many staff that human rights norms are
overly rigid, particularly when defined with respect to international legal instruments. They leave
little room for the tradeoffs that are often necessary in development practice.
As the lawyers debated over how to design the new trust fund, they were torn over
whether an instrumental approach would dilute the intrinsic meaning of human rights. They
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recognized that they needed a dual approach that adhered to not only a legal interpretation but
also the instrumental frame. Yet they were worried over possible risks in taking an overly
technical approach to rights. Despite their misgivings, the lawyers decided to emphasize how
human rights enhance development effectiveness and make good business sense. I call this
strategy: “economizing human rights.”186 It is an effort to demystify the concept of human rights
and build a constituency among staff while emphasizing an empirical approach that measures
human rights performance using indicators.
According to a senior Bank economist, “[w]e will not make inroads in the Bank if
[human rights] language is not made into economic language.”187 This statement suggests the
importance of translating human rights into the dominant discourse of economics. The decision
to economize human rights represents a recognition by the lawyers that past attempts to
introduce the agenda failed in part because of a failure to build a constituency at the Bank. The
following statement by another Bank economist emphasizes the value of empirical evidence in
pushing agendas like corruption forward within the institution:

I think that things really happen in the Bank when an economic case could be
made for them. You put it in economic language. This is how corruption came in.
It sort of became acceptable internally to talk about corruption when people could
show with cross-country regressions that it’s related to lower growth. . . . People
needed this to say that “Okay. It’s alright for us to work on this.” So one obstacle
would be to try and articulate rights issues in the way that economists could
understand.188
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As part of an attempt to speak to economists, the lawyers adopted a largely instrumental
approach to rights in the proposed Justice and Human Rights Trust Fund.
One of the trust fund’s main objectives was to “serve as a hub for bolstering an emerging
community of practice around human rights in the Bank.”189 In preparation for the trust fund, the
Norwegian government financed a workshop on May 15-16, 2006. The topic of the workshop
was developing indicators for “measuring justice,” in order to evaluate the performance of a
country’s justice sector.190 Also discussed at the workshop was the Legal Department’s project
on human rights indicators, developed in collaboration with the Danish Institute for Human
Rights, which began in 2005. As part of this empirical focus, the lawyers also proposed pilot
projects in borrower countries. Pilot projects would allow for an empirical study of the effects of
using a human rights approach in Bank projects, as compared to existing practices.
Operating “Under the Radar”: Pursuing Pilot Projects Rather than a Policy
The trouble with the Bank is that getting anything adopted as an institutional
position or strategy is really tough because . . . there’s been a shift towards
decentralizing things. So getting to a policy is almost the last step after things have
already percolated [within the institution]. It’s almost like practice precedes policy
in this place. . . . Back in the 1990s, it was the opposite way—that if you wanted
to get something done, you would push the policy first, and then practice would
follow. For example, the safeguard policies. Those were key to getting people to
change behavior. It’s kind of the opposite now. [Changes in] behavior tend to
happen through pilot projects.191
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After years of internal and external advocacy for an institutional policy on human rights, internal
advocates began moving towards a country-level approach. The lawyers who designed the trust
fund decided that Bank country staff should take the lead on any human rights initiative, with
support from the donor community. They felt that regional and national ownership of a human
rights agenda is critical. One reason for this tactic is the important decision-making role played
by country directors at the Bank, “much more so than vice presidents, . . . and certainly much
more so than sector directors or sector managers. [They are the ones] who are really making the
decisions in terms of resource allocation, and are leading the dialogue with the country.”192
One of the trust fund’s preparatory workshops focused on country-level initiatives,
including pilot projects, the integration of human rights principles into national development
strategies, and the promotion of human rights dialogues with national authorities.193 Another
proposed project was the incorporation of human rights into the poverty reduction strategy
papers of selected governments—those that request assistance in incorporating human rights
concerns in their development strategies. The Bank would assist the governments in “translating
internationally agreed human rights standards into operational policy actions, thereby prioritizing
support for those services that both contribute to economic and social development and
constitute human rights obligations on the state.”194 The team of lawyers behind the recent
approach made an important decision to focus on pilot projects rather than to advocate for a
stand-alone operational policy. One reason for this decision is the previously discussed staff
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incentive system, in which internal promotions are based on lending targets rather than
compliance with safeguard policies. In my interviews, I found a general resentment among staff
to the existing policies:

People [have been] feeling that the compliance police are after them, and that the
procedures are rigid and bureaucratic. . . . And there [is] a lot of weariness from
the experience of the safeguards about trying to make things mandatory because
it’ll be seen as a burden. So the idea is trying to do this through good practice
examples. . . .195
Another reason is the lawyers’ recognition that they could not get a policy approved by the
Board, which is sharply divided over the issue of human rights. As a result, they decided to
pursue an incremental strategy of working under the radar screen of the Board.
An incremental, under the radar strategy stands in contrast to one of mainstreaming,
which entails explicit management support for the incorporation of an issue into existing
programs. An example of prior mainstreaming is the incorporation of environmental concerns
into Bank programming through adoption of an operational policy on environmental
assessment.196 Yet to introduce a more sensitive and controversial issue like human rights,
internal advocates are supporting a strategy of implicit management support and avoidance of the
Board. A senior advisor to an Executive Director acknowledged the value of an incremental
strategy for human rights. He commented that Bank officials “shouldn’t try and get a formal
process going because it would backfire, and that [they] should basically do a human rights
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agenda through stealth.”197 The Executive Director of the Bank’s Nordic Baltic office agreed. He
explained that trust funds are a way to introduce controversial changes into the Bank: “The
strategy is to hurry slowly, below the radar.”198
V. CONCLUSION
Analyzing organizational culture is useful to understanding organizational change and
predicting how IOs behave. The conditions under which norms are adopted and internalized in
an organization are shaped by its culture, including its mission, management structure, incentive
system, and decision-making process. Internalization occurs when actors vernacularize norms, or
adapt them to local meanings and existing cultural values and practices.199 There is not a
universal recipe for how to bring about internalization in IOs. Rather it is necessary to find an
institutional fit for norms. They must be framed to adapt to the structural, functional, and cultural
distinctiveness of each institution.
The recent initiative to push human rights forward at the Bank offers insights on how to
bring about organizational change. Until recently, bureaucratic obstacles have impeded the
Bank’s adoption of human rights norms. In particular, there has been a clash of expertise
between lawyers and economists over how to define human rights and justify their relevance
with respect to the Bank’s mission. In an effort to appeal to the dominant subculture of
economists, internal advocates are framing human rights as quantifiable and instrumentally
valuable towards the economic development goals of the Bank. They are pursuing an
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incremental strategy from the bottom-up through country-level pilot projects, rather than a topdown official policy. By late 2006, the strategy became public and no longer under-the radar,200
but it is too early to gauge its success. This approach represents one potentially effective way of
bringing human rights norms into the Bank. Another may be to alter the existing distribution of
power within the institution (and thus the organizational culture) so that lawyers have more
decision-making power and status as compared to economists and other professional groups.
However this is a radical change that would likely take many years and would require support
from the leadership.
Human rights are a particularly difficult set of norms to incorporate into an economic
institution because they force employees into a struggle between principles and pragmatism—
i.e., a tension between pursuing normative, intangible values and goals, and finding a practical
way to solve problems (which may involve reconciling competing principles). In an environment
like the Bank where most issues are subject to cost-benefit analysis, employees may be
ambivalent about principles that appear to be non-negotiable or subject to trade-offs. They may
perceive potential costs to trying to commensurate seemingly incommensurable values.
What are the consequences of economizing rather than legalizing human rights? Some
critics fear that although legalizing human rights norms may limit their persuasiveness within the
Bank, an economic framework would dilute their meaning and serve as a ceiling for future
human rights standards of other development agencies. There are thus potential risks of
translating human rights too far into the existing power structure. As an anthropologist has
observed, if human rights “are translated so fully that they blend into existing power
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relationships completely, they lose their potential for social change.”201 This is part of the
dilemma of human rights framing and vernacularization strategies: they will not induce radical,
long-term change if they do not challenge existing power structures and are too compatible with
dominant ways of thinking.202 Yet they also need to resonate with local cultural understandings
in order to appear legitimate and appealing, and to thus become part of local rights
consciousness.203
This raises a number of important questions: Can human rights be so extensively
vernacularized that they lose their essential core, or even contradict their fundamental meanings?
Do human rights need to remain connected to a legal regime (and be linked to state obligations
deriving from international law) in order to still be considered “human rights” and not another
concept like “empowerment”?
Ethnographic studies can illuminate the process by which norms become internalized
within international institutions. They uncover the multiple normative frameworks that often
compete within institutions. Interpretive gaps between these frameworks may lead to underimplementation or inconsistent compliance to norms, whether human rights or otherwise.
Analyzing the organizational culture of an institution can help one determine how to overcome
bureaucratic obstacles and devise an appropriate strategy for organizational change.

201

MERRY, supra note 13, at 135-36.
Id. at 136, 222.
203
Id. at 137, 222.
202

68

